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Abstract
Evidence of Illusion of Control – the fact that people believe to have control over pure chance
events – is a recurrent finding in experimental psychology. Results in economics find instead
little to no support. In this paper we test whether this dissonant result across disciplines is
due to the fact that economists have implemented only one form of illusory control. We
identify and separately tests in an incentive-compatible design two types of control: a) over
the resolution of uncertainty, as usually done in the economics literature, and b) over the
choice of the lottery, as sometimes done in the psychology literature but without monetary
payoffs. Results show no evidence of illusion of control, neither on choices nor on beliefs
about the likelihood of winning.
JEL Classifications: B49; C91; D81
Keywords: Illusion of Control, Experiment, Risk Elicitation
1. Introduction
Langer (1975) defines illusion of control as an expectancy of a personal success probability
inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant.1 Skills and luck contribute
jointly to determine outcomes in most real life situations. Skills play nonetheless no role in
many situations in which the outcome is driven by uncontrollable random events. Illusion
of control induces subjects to perceive a positive degree of control in pure chance events,
and the straightforward consequence is a more risk seeking behavior.
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1Although implicitly assuming the existence of an objective measure of the probability of success that is often
not available (Presson and Benassi, 1996), this definition is still useful for illustrative purposes. Moreover, exper-
imental evidence is usually obtained manipulating the intensity of the treatment aimed at triggering illusion of
control. Therefore, causal evidence of the (qualitative effects of) illusion of control can be identified even when
lacking any objective probability of success.
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The psychology literature finds robust effects of illusion of control under a variety of cir-
cumstances and designs, as shown for instance in the meta-analysis by Presson and Benassi
(1996). The degree of expertise (Langer, 1975) or familiarity (Benassi et al., 1979) with the
randomization devices have been shown to affect the degree of illusory control. Subjects
think that the chance of success is higher when they are more involved in the randomiza-
tion procedure, as when they can choose the target numbers in a lottery game (Dunn and
Wilson, 1990; Langer, 1975) or when the outcome of the lottery is determined rolling a die
directly instead of having the experimenter doing so (Dunn and Wilson, 1990). When skills
are actually important, letting subjects be more involved, train, and familiarize with the task
increases their likelihood of succeeding. The inference humans make from real life that skills
make a difference appears to carry over to situations in pure chance events, such as lotteries,
where the subject has no control.
Different results have been found in the economics literature. Economists have focused
mainly on choices under risk, finding invariably little or no evidence of illusion of control.
For instance, Charness and Gneezy (2010) implement an Investment Game (Gneezy and
Potters, 1997) in which subjects can choose 3 ’winning’ numbers out of 6. They find that a
majority of subjects (68%) prefers to roll the die if this is costless, but only a small minority
(9%) does so when rolling the die costs 5% of their endowment. Poon (2011) also finds that
most of the subjects display indifference in a multiple price list task aimed at eliciting their
willingness to pay up to one dollar to exercise control in a lottery. Li (2011) finds instead
that subjects display a wide range of preferences in terms of control. Subjects may prefer to
keep control over the resolution of uncertainty, as well as display preferences for no control
(paying to be released from having to choose the numbers), and preferences for random-
ization (paying to let a coin toss decide who will pick the numbers). Li (2011) attributes his
results to preferences for different sources of uncertainty (Chew and Sagi, 2008; Tversky and
Wakker, 1995) rather than to illusion of control.2
One possible explanation for this striking difference in findings is that the literature in
experimental economics has been restricted to one type only of illusion of control, obtained
2Li (2011) also finds that less than 5% of the subjects believe that having control will increase their probability
of winning, even among those who choose to have control.
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by giving subjects (illusory) control over the resolution of uncertainty. This has usually been
done by letting subjects roll the dice, or asking their willingness to pay to have control over
the rolling. There is, however, another form of illusory control over more concrete aspects of
the choice itself. In the psychological literature this has been done, e.g., by allowing subjects
to choose and trade their lottery ticket rather than being assigned one (Langer, 1975), or
by asking subjects to press buttons that might or might not have consequences (Gino et al.,
2011). In other words, a greater involvement can concern the choice of which lottery should
be played, instead of how to resolve uncertainty of a given lottery (who should roll the die,
which are the outcome numbers, etc.). These two phases of a decision under risk are clearly
distinct from a theoretical point of view, thereby identifying two different kinds of illusion
of control, which do not necessarily have similar effects.
Moreover, real life decisions under risk can usually be described as the choice of a lottery:
imagine an investor who chooses between assets characterized by different risk profiles, a
citizen who fills the tax declaration, a patient that follows a therapy, the decision to subscribe
an insurance contract as well as the possible moral hazard problem that follows, and so on.
In all these circumstances, the choices made affect the nature (payoffs and probabilities) of
the lottery that will be played, while they do not usually affect the decision over the final
outcome. It is indeed very difficult to imagine a situation in which the agents are given
active involvement in the resolution of uncertainty, as even at the casino players are not
given the option to spin the roulette by themselves. In contrast, the experimental evidence
on illusion of control in economics has been gathered manipulating the degree of control in
the resolution of uncertainty only.
In this paper we test whether the striking difference of results across disciplines is due
to the fact that experimental economists have restricted their attention to one and not all
possible forms of illusory control. We do so setting up a design that clearly identifies and
separately manipulates in an incentivized setting the illusion of control over the choice (or
definition) of the lottery vs. the illusion of control over the resolution of uncertainty.3
3Distinguishing the two phases of decision under risk also has the advantage of allowing to better interpret
previous findings. For instance, Charness and Gneezy (2010) report that the amount invested (i.e. the choice of
the lottery) does not differ, regardless of subjects expressing preferences for control or not over the resolution of
uncertainty.
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Towards this goal we exploit some useful features of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
(BRET) (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). On the one hand, the BRET allows us to measure
whether illusion of control makes subjects more risk seeking, similarly to the design of Char-
ness and Gneezy (2010). On the other hand, the BRET can be manipulated to incorporate
both types of illusion of control in a homogeneous environment, thereby making the results
comparable. The BRET allows us to manipulate the control over the resolution of uncer-
tainty, as traditionally done in the economics literature, by letting the subjects roll the dice
that determine the position of the bomb. Furthermore, the BRET can accomodate the degree
of control in the collection process itself, by allowing subjects to click to collect every single
box vs. just choosing a stopping point. Note that in the BRET the choice made by the sub-
jects determines simultaneously both the amounts at stake and the probability of securing
them, making the BRET rather similar to most of the aforementioned real life situations, in
which the choices affect directly outcomes and probabilities.
We find null results across the board. Neither the perceived probability of winning nor
the choice made react to the experimental manipulations. While increased involvement in
the resolution of uncertainty was already known to have little to no effect when incentives
matter, our experiment sheds light on the fact that null results extend to an increased in-
volvement of the subjects in the generation of the lottery. According to our results, the
disappearance of the illusion of control finding in economics experiments as compared with
the psychological literature might be due to the role played by incentives.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 and 3 we illustrate the design and pro-
cedure of our experiment. Section 4 presents our findings, while Section 5 summarizes and
concludes.
2. Experimental Design
Our treatments are all built on the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET), a visual real time
risk elicitation task introduced by Crosetto and Filippin (2013). Subjects face a 10× 10 square
in which each numbered cell represents a box. They are told that 99 boxes are empty, while
one contains a time bomb programmed to explode at the end of the task, i.e., after choices
have been made. The position of the time bomb b ∈ [1, 100] is randomly determined after
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the choice is made with a roll of two 10-sided dice, allowing to generate random uniform
numbers from 1 to 100. Calling k the number of boxes collected, if k∗i ≥ b it means that sub-
ject i collected the bomb, which by exploding wipes out the subject’s earnings. In contrast,
if k∗i < b, subject i leaves the minefield without the bomb and receives 10 euro cents for
every box collected. The metaphor of the time bomb allows to implement a choice in strat-
egy method, avoiding the truncation of the data that would happen in case of a real-time
notification.
Subjects’ decision can be formalized as the choice of their favorite among the set L of 101
lotteries fully described both in terms of probabilities and outcomes by the stopping point
k ∈ [0, 100],
L =

0 k100
0.1k 100−k100
.
k drives at the same time the change of probabilities and the amounts of money at stake,
summarizing the trade-off between the amount of money that can be earned and the likeli-
hood of obtaining it. The degree of risk aversion negatively correlates with the choice of k
and a risk-neutral subject should choose k = 50.
2.1. Baseline Treatment: the classic Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
In the Baseline condition there are a “Start” and a “Stop” button below the square. From
the moment the subject presses “Start” one box is automatically collected per second, start-
ing from the upper left corner of the square. A screenshot of the task after 35 seconds (i.e.,
after 35 boxes have been collected) as shown to the subjects is reported in Figure 1. The
subject is informed about the number of boxes collected at any point in time. Each time a
box is collected, the subject’s provisional account is credited with 10 additional euro cents.4
The subject can, at any time, stop the drawing process by hitting the “Stop” button, thus
determining the preferred number of boxes to collect, k ∈ [0, 100].
In the baseline treatment, subjects were exposed to a one-shot standard BRET, followed
4The expected value of of the BRET task for a risk neutral player is therefore 2.5 euro.
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Figure 1: The BRET interface after 35 seconds
by a questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, the experimenters went around the lab to
roll individually and privately in each cubicle the two ten-sided dice used to determine the
position of the bomb.
2.2. Control over the resolution of uncertainty: ’Roll’
We introduce illusion of control over the resolution of uncertainty by allowing the sub-
jects to roll the dice themselves. This minimal manipulation has been around at least since
Dunn and Wilson (1990) and has been commonly used in experimental economics (Charness
and Gneezy, 2010; Li, 2011). The subjects go through a standard BRET in all details identical
to the baseline treatment, but they roll individually and privately the dice to determine the
position of the bomb. The subjects are aware that they will be in charge of the rolling from
the very beginning of the experiment.
We run two different treatments, increasing in the degree of familiarity with the dice. In
the Roll treatment the subjects receive the dice at the end of the experiment, are allowed to
roll twice for practice, and then roll once to determine the position of the bomb. In the Roll
with Experience treatment, the subjects receive the dice at the beginning of the experiment,
and are given extra time to familiarize with them before going through the BRET.
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2.3. Control over the choice of the lottery: ’Click’
We introduce control over the shaping of the lottery by slightly modifying the BRET. In
the Click treatment, we manipulate the way in which the subjects make their choice. Instead
of stopping an automatic process like in Baseline, subjects are asked to click to collect ev-
ery single box. In the BRET interface the “Start” button is replaced by a “Collect” button.
Each time that the subjects press “Collect”, one box is collected. The subjects have hence
to click several times to reach their desired stopping point. This procedure leads to a more
active involvement in the choice of the preferred lottery. In this treatment the resolution of
uncertainty is identical to the Baseline condition, as the dice are rolled by the experimenters.
3. Procedures
The experiment was run in January 2013 at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of
Economics in Jena, Germany. We implemented a pure between-subjects design. 86 subjects
took part to the Baseline BRET treatment, 93 to Roll, 62 to Roll with Experience, and 90 to the
Click treatment, for a total of 331 subjects distributed over 11 sessions, each lasting about
half an hour. The sample includes mainly students from the Friedrich Schiller University
Jena, Germany.
The experiment was computerized. The experimental software was programmed in
Python (van Rossum, 1995).
Upon entering the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer. Subjects found
noise-reducing acoustic earmuffs on their desk. We introduced earmuffs to avoid the strong
herd and contagion effects that could otherwise occur in the Click treatment. In fact, Crosetto
and Filippin (2015) show that subjects substantially change their choices when hearing each
others’ clicking. In order not to bias results, the earmuffs were used in all treatments alike.
Instructions were displayed on the screen and read aloud.5 Then subjects answered a set
of multiple-choice control questions. No subject was allowed to continue until all control
questions had been answered correctly. We recorded the number of errors submitted in the
control questions and the time needed to clear the control question screen to be used as a
5The English translation of the original German instructions is available in Appendix A.
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control in the data analysis. After all subjects had correctly answered all control questions,
and after the odd-out clarifying questions were individually addressed, subjects were asked
to wear the earmuffs and went through a trial period in order to experience the visual rep-
resentation of the task. At the end of the trial period, however, there was no draw of the
bomb’s position in order not to provide the subjects with reference points. The paying task
was then played one-shot.
Subjects were then asked to remove the earmuffs and fill in a questionnaire contain-
ing demographic questions (age, gender, number of siblings, field of study), the SOEP self-
reported risk question,6 a self-reported measure of difficulty with the task, on a Likert scale
from 0 (easy) to 10 (hard) and a question asking them to report their beliefs on the proba-
bility of winning. The reason why we directly ask for the perceived probability of winning
is that involvement in the resolution of uncertainty has been already shown to have little to
no effect on choices in other economics experiments (Charness and Gneezy, 2010; Li, 2011).
Therefore, a direct measure of illusion of control that elicits subjective probability of success
is more likely to detect a possible weak effect of the treatment.7
At the end of the experiment the uncertainty surrounding the position of the bomb was
resolved by means of the rolling of two ten-sided dice. The exact procedures for the rolling
were treatment-dependent, as described above in Section 2.
4. Results
The average earning was 4.58 euro, including a show-up fee of 2.5 euro, in line with
usual earnings for short experiments in Jena.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the average choice in the task by treatment.
Choices are rather similar across treatments and fairly close to risk neutrality.
6We employed the general risk question used in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, see Wagner et al.,
2007) on a 0− 10 scale: “How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” The validity of this self-reported question to elicit risk attitudes as
compared to the results of incentivized lottery-based tasks has been explored by Dohmen et al. (2011), who find
that self-reported answers can represent a valid low-cost substitute for incentivized lottery schemes, although
the fraction of variance explained is quite low (about 6%).
7Presson and Benassi (1996) argue that the measured effects of illusion of control are lower when subjects
are directly asked the probability of success, because this is likely to make them realize that indeed such a
probability cannot have changed because of the increased involvement. Our design cannot trigger such an
effect because the probability is asked after the choice has been made.
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Mean choice SOEP
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
BRET 49.15 11.78 4.94 2.09
Roll 50.27 12.86 5.27 2.05
Roll Experience 49.21 10.28 5.18 1.85
Click 47.13 12.53 4.88 1.95
Table 1: Mean choice and SOEP self-reported risk attitudes, by treatment
Only the Click treatment displays a slightly lower point estimate, i.e. in the opposite di-
rection as the expected effect of illusion of control, but not significantly so. In fact, Kruskal-
Wallis non-parametric test of equality in median does not reject the null of no difference
across all treatments (p-value = 0.3973). Our subjects also display similar and not statisti-
cally different answers to the SOEP self-reported risk aversion measure.
Figure 2: Kernel density estimate of choices, by treatment
Choices are also very similar in distribution. Figure 2 reports kernel density estimates of
the number of boxes collected by treatment. The distribution of the baseline BRET and of the
two Roll treatments is virtually identical. The Click treatment displays a flatter distribution,
with less of a spike at 48-49 and some more weight on the tails. Still, equality between Click
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and Baseline distributions is not rejected (Mann-Whitney p-value = 0.4319; Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two-sample test, p-value = 0.182). Hence, our results strongly reject any effect of
illusion of control when giving more active involvement both on the choice of the lottery
and on the resolution of uncertainty.
If illusion of control had a weak effect, the choice of the lottery is not likely to reflect
it. Therefore, we also analyze whether illusion of control has at least a direct effect on the
perceived likelihood of winning (variable belief ), despite not being translated into a different
choice. Note that in the BRET the objective probability of winning is by construction equal
to 100− k, where k represents the number of boxes collected. Given that the probability of
winning depends on the actual choice we also build the variable overconfidence, given by the
difference between the perceived and objective probabilities of winning.8 Table 2 shows the
average values of belief and overconfidence by treatment.
Belief Overconfidence
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
BRET 51.84 15.83 0.99 17.76
Roll 50.57 15.40 0.84 17.56
Roll Experience 51.06 14.29 0.27 16.72
Click 51.13 15.25 -1.73 19.86
Table 2: Mean beliefs on probability of winning and overconfidence, by treatment
Both variables turn out to be statistically indistinguishable across conditions. The mean
belief about the probability of winning does not differ (K-Wallis p-value = 0.9881), and sim-
ilar results are obtained adjusting for the objective probability of winning at the individual
level (K-Wallis p-value = 0.9718). Moreover, despite a considerable individual heterogene-
ity, the average overconfidence is very close to zero (p-value≥ 0.413 in all treatments) mean-
ing that subject hold correct beliefs on average. The distribution of overconfidence across
treatments is also rather similar, as shown by the kernel density estimations of Figure 3.
Therefore, also the elicitation of the perceived probability of winning does not detect any
8Note that the variable overconfidence operationalizes exactly the definition by Langer (1975) of illusion of
control as an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would
warrant.
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effect of illusion of control.
Figure 3: Kernel density estimate of overconfidence, by treatment
Finally, we report in Table 3 the results of a multivariate analysis aimed at investigat-
ing whether illusion of control appears in subgroups of our subjects pool and/or once we
control for individual characteristics. Again, we do not find any significant effects of the
experimental manipulations either on the choice (columns 1-2) or on the overconfidence
of our subjects (columns 3-4). Males and females do not differ in terms of illusion of con-
trol, as emphasized by columns 2 and 4 which include an interaction between gender and
our experimental conditions.9 A few control variables display a significant effect, although
constant across all the experimental conditions. Subjects who are slower in completing the
control questions are more underconfident, while the opposite behavioral trait characterizes
those who make more mistakes, possibly signaling a lower understanding of the task. Fi-
nally, the number of siblings significantly correlate both with a more risk averse behavior
and higher underconfidence.
9Only in the Baseline females appear more risk averse, although at weak significance levels.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Choice Choice Overconfidence Overconfidence
Click -1.896 (-1.03) -2.644 (-0.93) -2.443 (-0.89) -1.919 (-0.45)
Roll 0.989 (0.53) -3.232 (-1.13) -0.375 (-0.14) -4.900 (-1.15)
Roll Experience -0.376 (-0.17) -2.903 (-0.89) -0.434 (-0.13) -4.785 (-0.99)
Click × Female -2.863 (-1.05) -3.976 (-0.97)
Roll × Female 2.609 (0.99) 3.965 (1.01)
Roll Experience × Female 0.297 (0.09) 4.366 (0.91)
Female -1.177 (-0.81) -4.510∗ (-1.69) -0.100 (-0.05) -3.606 (-0.91)
Age 0.232 (1.06) 0.234 (1.07) -0.145 (-0.45) -0.154 (-0.47)
Mistakes in CQ 0.037 (0.60) 0.039 (0.62) 0.160∗ (1.73) 0.157∗ (1.69)
Time in CQ/10 -0.014 (-0.21) -0.001 (-0.10) -0.216∗∗ (-2.09) -0.205∗∗ (-1.98)
Nr. of siblings -0.938∗ (-1.73) -0.996∗ (-1.83) -1.600∗∗ (-1.98) -1.680∗∗ (-2.07)
Constant 45.60∗∗∗ (8.44) 47.41∗∗∗ (8.67) 10.50 (1.30) 12.61 (1.54)
N 330 330 330 330
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Other controls not included: faculty, previous experience in the lab.
Table 3: Multivariate regressions of choice and overconfidence
5. Conclusion
Illusion of control is the process by which people behave as if they have control in pure
luck situations characterized by no objective control. Evidence of illusion of control is a
recurrent finding in a large number of psychological studies, while the fewer laboratory
experiments in economics find little to no effect.
This striking difference in findings might be due to the different domain of illusion of
control that have been tested. The literature in experimental economics has been restricted
to one type only of illusion of control, the one obtained increasing the involvement of the
subjects in the resolution of uncertainty. This has usually been done by letting subjects roll
the dice. By doing so illusion of control should bias upwards the perceived probability of
being successful, and in turn affect the subject’s choices in the task towards a more risk
seeking behavior. A different source of illusion of control could stem from an enhanced
involvement of the subject in the choice of the lottery to be played, i.e., in the decision under
risk, rather than in the resolution of uncertainty. This second type of illusion of control has
been tested in psychological studies only.
This paper aims at testing whether the dissonant results in the literature are due to the
type of illusion of control that is triggered. We do so using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task.
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The BRET allows us on the one hand to replicate the manipulations traditionally adopted in
the economics literature, by letting the subjects roll the dice that determine the position of
the bomb. On the other hand, it allows us to extend the investigation of illusion of control by
varying the degree of control in the choice of the lottery to be played. We do so by allowing
subjects to click to collect every single box vs. just choosing a stopping point.
Our results show no evidence of illusion of control across the board. Neither letting the
subjects roll, nor letting them click to have a more active involvement in the choice of the
lottery result in any effect either on the chosen number of boxes collected or on the perceived
probability of avoiding the bomb. The experimental manipulations do not induce significant
effects along a gender perspective, a results that survives the inclusion of individual-level
controls in a multivariate analysis. The results of our experiments allows us to conclude
that the striking difference of results across disciplines is not due to the fact that experimen-
tal economists have restricted their attention to one and not all possible forms of illusory
control.
An alternative interpretation consistent with our results is that illusion of control might
occur in hypothetical choices, typically used in psychological studies, but be crowded out
by monetary incentives used in the lab by economists. Dunn and Wilson (1990) report that
illusion of control is reduced even when inflating hypothetical payoffs in a non-incentivized
experiment, supporting this interpretation as an interesting line of future research aimed at
rationalizing the dissonant results in the literature.
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Appendix A. Instructions
Welcome screen
You are about to participate in an experiment in which following the instructions care-
fully, making good decisions, and with a bit of luck, you can earn money. Different partic-
ipants may earn different amounts according to their choices. For your participation in the
experiment you will earn an additional show-up fee of 2.5 Euro. All the monetary values
during the experiment are expressed in Euro cents.
Procedure Screen
The experiment consists of 4 stages in the following order:
1. An Instruction Stage that we are currently going through. At the end of this stage you
will be asked some control questions to verify your understanding of the task. After
everybody answers correctly, we will proceed with the following stage.
2. A Decision Stage, in which you will make decisions and answer questions relevant to
your final payoff.
3. A Questionnaire, in which you will be asked a few questions not related to your final
payoff.
4. A Feedback Stage, in which your earnings from the experiment will be privately deter-
mined. You will not be given any feedback on the monetary outcome of your decisions
before the Feedback Stage.
Task instruction screen
On your screen you will see a field composed of boxes numbered 1 through 100. Your
task is to decide on the number of boxes to collect out of 100 such boxes. You earn 10 Euro
cents for each box collected. At any moment you can see the amount earned up to that point.
Such earnings are only potential, however, because exactly one of these 100 boxes contains
a time bomb, that if collected destroys all the boxes collected. You do not know the bombs
location. You only know that it is equally likely to be in any of the 100 boxes. Moreover,
even if you collect the time bomb, you will not know it until the end of the experiment.
[Baseline] To start collecting boxes you have to click the Play button that you will see on the
screen. A box will automatically be collected at every second starting from the top left corner
and following the numerical order until you decide to hit the Stop button when the number
corresponds to how many boxes you want to collect. Once collected, each box disappears
from the screen.
[Click] In order to collect each box you have to click once the Collect’ button that you will
see on the screen. Boxes are collected starting from the top left corner and following the
numerical order until you decide to stop collecting and hit the Stop button when the number
corresponds to how many boxes you want to collect. Once collected, each box disappears
from the screen. At the end of the experiment, after answering some questions and filling
out a short questionnaire, the number of the box containing the bomb will be randomly
determined.
* * *
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[Baseline] An experimenter will come at your desk with two 10-sided dice. One will be used
to determine the tens, the other the units. After letting you check that the dice are regular,
the experimenter will roll them to determine the position of the bomb between 1 and 100.
[Roll] An experimenter will come at your desk with two 10-sided dice. One will be used
to determine the tens, the other the units. After letting you check that the dice are regular,
you will roll them twice in order to familiarize with the procedure without this counting
towards your final earnings. The third time you will roll them will determine the position
of the bomb between 1 and 100.
[Roll with Experience] Before the main task, an experimenter will distribute the two dice. You
will have two minutes to familiarize with the dice and to check that the dice are regular. You
can roll them as many times as you wish. At the end of the task an experimenter will come
at your desk. You will then roll the dice once to determine the position of the bomb between
1 and 100.
* * *
If the number of the box in which the bomb is located is higher than the number of boxes
you collected, you do not collect the bomb and you earn 10 Euro cents for each collected
box. If the number of the box in which the bomb is located is lower than or equal to the
number of boxes you collected, you do collect the bomb and you earn zero.
Control Questions
Please answer the following control questions. Answers to these questions are not rele-
vant to your earnings. The computer will give you a feedback on whether your responses
are correct or not. If you have any problems in answering, please raise your hand and an
experimenter will come to assist you. After everyone answers correctly all the questions, we
will proceed with the decision stage.
1. Suppose that the bomb is located in box 25.
• If you collect 21 boxes, how much will you earn in Euro cent?
• If you collect 38 boxes, how much will you earn in Euro cent?
• If you collect 62 boxes, how much will you earn in Euro cent?
• If you collect 79 boxes, how much will you earn in Euro cent?
2. Now suppose that the bomb is located in box 75.
• If you collect 21 boxes, how much will you earn in Euro cent?
• If you collect 38 boxes, how much will you earn in Euro cent?
• If you collect 62 boxes, how much will you earn in Euro cent?
• If you collect 79 boxes, how much will you earn in Euro cent?
3. What is the probability of the bomb being in boxes number:
• 51 through 70
• 21 though 50
• 1 through 10
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• 61 through 100
4. The location of the bomb depends on how many boxes you decide to collect. [YES/NO]
5. Suppose the location of the bomb is identical to the number of boxes you collect. Will
you earn a positive amount? [YES/NO]
6. Who will roll the dice to determine the position of the bomb? [Me/Experimenter/Another
participant]
Please note that the numbers used in these questions are for illustrative purposes only.
They are not meant to be a guidance for your choice.
Earmuffs screen
Now if everything is clear please wear the earmuffs you see on your desk. You will be
notified in another screen later when you have to remove them.
Decision screen
Please choose the number of boxes to collect.
[Baseline] Hit the Play button to start collecting the boxes. One box will be automatically
collected at every second.
[Click] In order to collect each box you have to click once the Collect’ button.
Boxes are collected starting from the top left corner and following the numerical order.
When the number corresponds to how many boxes you want to collect hit the Stop button.
Then confirm your choice by clicking on Confirm.
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